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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
HUBERT \YOLFE, SHIRLEY 'VOL:F,~J, 
his wife, ELLIOTT vVOLFE, KA YLA 
WOLFE, and ~IERRILL STRONG, Co-
partners, doing business under the fir1n 
narne and stvle of \VOLFE'S DEPART-
~IENT STORE and WOLF£ 'S DE-
P ART11 EXT STORE, a copartnership. 
Plai-ntiffs and Appellatnls, 
vs. 
SARAH WHITE and JA~fES L. \VHITE, 
her husband, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAIN·TIFFS 
AND APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
715'3 
CO~fMENTS ON ''RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT 
OF CASE" (Page 1) 
Respondents have made their own statement of the 
case although plaintiffs' and appellants' ''Statement of 
Facts'' contains the lease in full, the complaint with 
amendments, bill of particulars and exhibits in full. Be-
cause we felt that it would he more convenient for the 
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court if each Inetnber of the court had before him thP 
documents in their enthety, we made no attempt to 
abridge the documents. An abridgement also is apt to 
present incompletely the actual story that should be dis-
closed. This is quite evident from the staternent of the 
case in respondents' brief. He>spondents set forth para-
graphs 3, 6, 8 and 11 with eertain portions of them 
italicized and do not refer to other paragraphs or pro-
visions of the lease that are significant and of controlling 
importance. For instance respondents leave out para-
graph 5 which shows that the plaintiffs (lessees) actual-
ly had no rights or obligations under the lease and as 
to them there really was no lease until June 7, 1946, even 
though the lease is dated February ,-19, 1945, for a term 
eommencing :March 7, 1945. Aetually plaintif~s' term was 
only from June 7, 1946, to and including ~iay 31, 1956, 
which term if' spoken of throughout the lease as "the 
last ten years of this lease.·· There were the first 15 
months covered hy the lease during which the defendants 
(lessors) had obligation~' under thP lease, but during 
whieh period plaintiffs had no rights or obligations. 
Also in their abridgement of th~ complaint defend-
ant~ leave out many things that are actually pres·ent anrl 
which should be included if a fair and adequate state-
ment i~ to he presented. On page 5 of respondents' brief 
on the first line the last word should be ''erection'' in-
stead of ''construction.'' Further down on the page re-
~pondents in stating the contents of the Building Code 
(·onfine their attention to Sec. 301, whereas the complaint 
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gives the substance of all the sections referred to ther~:.. · 
in. The complaint calls attention to the fact that the pro-
visions of the Code authorized the condemnation of any 
building or portion thereof found to be dangerous or un,-
safe or which violate the provisions of the Code ''due to 
deterioration or other defects.'' The quoted language is 
not included in respondents' statement nor do respond-
. ents call attention to the fact that in addition to pro-
hibiting the building condemned to be occupied the Code 
also prohil;>its it to be "used for: any purpose." Nor do 
defendants in their statement include the allegations of 
the complaint that they refused to take any action what-
soever to put the roof in good condition and that ·plain:. 
tiffs were excluded from possession of the premises be-
cause of the condition of. the roof. Nor do they call at-
tention to the allegations of the complaint that plain-
tiffs repeatedly notified defendants that if def·endants 
did not take some steps to put the roof in good c~:Q.di..., 
tion and to meet the requirements of the public authori:.. 
ties plaintiffs would be compelled. to do so and hold de-; 
fendants liable therefor. Nor do the defendants point out 
that the complaint alleges that while a new roof was put 
on much of the old roof was salvaged and used in the 
new roof and that while steel beam construction was 
used that that was as cheap or ·cheaper than 'lumber and 
that at that time only green lumber was obtainable at 
a cost higher even than steel. Nor do they call attention 
to the fact that plaintiffs expressly eliminated from 
their claim for damages any charges that could be ques-
tioned as being excessive. Actually the complaint alleges 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the Building ·Code specifies that if a building or 
portion thereof is dangerous or unsafe due to deteriora-
tion or other defects it shall not be occupied or used for 
any pur·pose until it has been made safe; that defendants' 
attention was called not only to the r·equirements of the 
Building Inspector but also to thP fact that actually and 
aside fron1 the Building Inspector's opinion the roof was 
unsafe; that defendants refused not only to comply with 
the Building Inspector's requirements but r·efused to do 
anything at all with reference to the roof, and that as a 
result thP plaintiffs were excluded from occupying the 
premises for the purposes for which they were leased to 
them; that plaintiffs told defendants that if they didn't 
fix the roof plaintiffs would do it and hold them re-
sponsible: that Plaintiffs did fix it as cheaply as they 
could and salvaged and used all they could of the e:xist-
ing materials in their construction work. St,eel construc-
tion was not used as indicated hy respondents. The 
steel was used in the steel beams. 
Respondents' break-down of the leas·e agreement 
into paragraphs a, b, (' and d on pages 6 and 7 of their 
brief does not reflect the actual or controlling provisions 
of the lease at all. 
There is in the lease no such unqualified acceptance 
of the premises as counsel would indicate. Paragraph 
6 nmst be construed in connection with the other pro-
visions of the lease, particularly those of paragraph 3, 
5, 8 and 18. This j:-; also 'true of paragraph 11. One phrase 
of one paragraph cannot be singled out as the eontrolling 
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provision of the lease and construed alone without any 
reference to re1uaining provisions of the lease explana-
tory of and applicable to such phrase. There is no period 
as indicated on page o of defendants brief (a), after 
the words ''accept said pre1nises in the condition and 
state of repair they are now in.'' Our acceptance of the 
premises was qualified and the roof was expressly ex-
cepted. The ren1aining portion of paragraph 6 clearly 
shows when construed with the other provisions of the 
lease that the lessees assmned no responsibility for any 
of the pre1nises until June 7, 1946. Up to that time under 
paragraph 5 the plaintiffs had nothing to do with the 
pre1nises and had no rights and no obligations. For the 
period preceding June 7, 1946, and for the remaining ten 
years of the lease the lessors under the ·exception in 
·paragraph 6 and under paragraph 8 had all the obliga-
tions with reference to the roof. For the last ten years 
of the lease the lessees agreed only that all improve-
ments, upkeep and repairs of every kind and nature 
whatsoever, etc., ''except as hereinafter stated,'' were 
to be made at their expense. This did not include any 
structural changes which were expressly excluded as 
their responsibility and they were forbidden to do then1 
under paragraph 3, nor the roof by reason of paragraph 
8. It is obvious that the lessees for the first 15 months 
of the lease had no obligation whatever concerning any 
of the premises. That was the obligation of the lessor. 
For the last ten years of the lease if ''improvements, 
upkeep and repairs, of every kind and nature whatso-
ever, regardless of the extent thereof, and whether the 
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Harne be ordinary or extraordinary, and regardless of 
how the same may be necessitated.'' were required for the 
1·oof they were expressly excluded by the lease terms 
front the obligation of the plaintiffs. By the termH of 
paragraph 8 and by exclusion from paragraph 6 the 
roof at all times was the obligation of the lessors. 
On page 7 of their brief under paragraph B defend-
ants purport to quote the provisions of paragraph 6. 
Their quotation, however, leaves out and overlooks five 
commas which are found in paragraph 6 of the lease. 
In the lease itself the phrase, "except as hereinafter 
stated,'' ref.ers to everything that precedes the phrase. 
It is separated from the remainder of the paragraph 'by 
eomma~. 1 n defendants' quotation it would appear that 
the words, ''except as hereinafter stated,'' modified the 
words, ''and i·egardless of how the fo'ame may b€> neces-
sitated.'' That is not the way the paragraplt reads. 
When construed in connection with the remaining pro-
vision~ of the lease it is clear from the lease itself, 
that in addition to the other matters recited, the lessees 
accept~d the premises in the condition and state of re-
pair they are now in, ''except as hereinafter stated.'' 
J1~xpressed another way, under the language of the lease 
the premise~ were accepted hy the lessees onl~' upon the 
('ondition that the lessors for the entire terrn would keep 
the roof in good condition and repair. Lessor .James L. 
vVhite drafted and composed the lease. When he put the 
words in the lease that he would keep the roof in good 
condition and repair, he then•hy represented that it was 
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in good condition at the tiine the preiniseH were m~­
cepted. He also agreed further that if at any time dur-
ing the entire tenn, including the 15 1nonths when lesseeH 
were out of possession, the roof was not in good condi-
tion, defendants would be required to keep it in good 
condition. We have already on page 41 of our original 
brief given the definition of the words ~'to keep,'' '·roof'' 
and ·'good condition.'· These definitions were not dis-
puted by defendants, and under these definitions . the 
lessors agreed to maintain and preserve fr01n risk or 
danger from the beginning to the end, the cover of the 
building including the roofing and all the materials and 
construction necessary to carry and maintain the same 
upon the walls or other uprights, in a reasonably safe 
condition, sufficient or satisfactory for its purposes. 
However, "to keep" and "good condition" hav,e such 
common meanings that the words speak for themselves. 
"To keep" means "to maintain" and "good condition" 
means good condition, not dangerous or unsafe con-
dition or in such a condition that· the premises cannot 
be occupied or used. It is grotesque to assert that under 
this lease defendants had no responsibility for a roof that 
was so inadequate and unsafe as to prohibit the use of 
the premises which they leased to the plaintiffs for. ten 
years. 
With reference to paragraph D (paragraph 11 of the 
lease) on page 7 of defendants' brief, the lease itself 
shows that that paragraph only exempted the lessors 
from liability for plaintiffs' failure to keep the premises 
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in repair. Paragraph 11 when construed with the rest of 
the lease exempts the lessors front liability for failure 
of the lesees to perform their obligations. Paragraph 11 
does not exentpt dependants for their failure ''to keep the 
roof in good (•ondition.'' We shall refer to this paragraph 
later. 
DEFENDAN1,S' "ARGUMENT'' ON PAGE I 
Throughout their brief defendants do as the~· did 
In the lower court_. The~· assume that all they were re-
quired to do was to keep the roof in repair. According 
to the defendants the lease reads: ''Lessees accept the 
premises in the condition and state of repair they are 
now in, so for the entire terrn of this lease the lessors 
shall have the obligation only to keep the roof of the 
leased premises in the same condition a~ it now i:.;, even 
though it is or becomes dangerou~ and unsafe.'' That il-' 
the effect of the defendants' argument. That, however, is 
not what the lease says. We accepted the premises in 
the condition they were then in only upon defendants' 
express pron1ise that so far as the roof was concerned it 
would be maintained by them in a safe and proper eon-
dHion at all times both before we took poss-ession and 
afterwards. Defendants, themselves also defined the ex-
tent of their obligation in paragraph 6 by stating that 
all irnprovements, upkeep and repairs, regardless of how 
the same may be necessitated, and regardless of the ex-
tent thereof, whether ordinary or extra-ordinary did not 
apply to the roof. \V e were to do none of those thingH 
to or for the roof. Those were defendants' obligation~. 
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.And it was only with this understanding that we accepted 
the premises. 
Defendants discuss the lease as though the words 
··in good condition~' were not in it. The fact that the 
words "in good condition'' are used and that the word 
··repair'' is also used clearly indicate that they refer 
to different things. ''Good condition'' means something 
different than ''repair,'' or the words would not have 
been used. The parties 1neant that something other than 
mere repairs were to be done by the lessors. The de-
fendants' obligations with reference to the roof were just 
as extensive as were plainti;fs' obligations for other 
matters under paragraph 6. 
DEFENDANTS' ARGU.\fENT ON PAGJ1~ 9 
Defendants on page 9 and the following pages up to 
page 23 argue that they were only obligated to make or-
dinary repairs to the roof. They cite many cases on this 
point. Cases dealing merely with the obligation to repair 
have no application to this case. Be that as it may, many 
of the cases cited by defendants if applied to the facts 
here would be directly opposed to the theory asserted by 
defendants. For instance on page 9 defendants cite St. 
Joseph, etc. vs. St. Louis, et1c., 36 S.W. 602. In that case 
the plaintiff leased its railroad to the Wabash Railroad. 
Wabash agreed to put the road in such condition that 
it could be operated efficiently. Wabash did not do this 
and sublet to the defendant who only agreed to deliver 
up the property in the same good order and repair as it 
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was in at the tin1e of the subleting. The pl~intiff tried to 
hold the defendant for the breach committed by Wabash. 
rrhe defendant itself had _greatly improved the road, but 
the lease had been broken and violated before defendant 
took possession. The court said that the sub-lessee was 
not liable for the prior breach and was only required to 
rnaintain the road in the same condition it was in when 
it took it. The referee, however, to whom the case was 
referred in the beginning stated that if W abaRh had 
been the defendant he would have found for the plain-
tiff. Applying the rule of that case to the case at bar, 
the defendants agreed that for the 15 mbnths before we 
went into possession they would keep the roof in good 
condition. We accepted the premises in reliance upon 
this promise. They did not do so. The lease was breached 
before we went into possession. Defendants cite on page 
9 excerpts from 36 C.J. and 32 Am .• Jur. These authorities 
must be considered in connection with the entire subject 
under discussion and in connection with the cases sup-
porting the text. Fot instance 36 C .• J. 142, the same page 
referred to by defendants, also states, ''A covenant b~, 
the landlord to repair and to keep in repair * "" * obligates 
him to put thr premises in repair if out of repair at the 
time of the rnaking of the lease." This rule applied to 
our case makes defendants' liability elear. And 'in the 
next subdivision, 781, it states that the duty of the tenant 
to make repairs does not include structural changes or 
unforeseen building alterations required by publie 
authorities, even though the tenant had agreed in the 
lease to make repairs. We not only had not agreed to 
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n1ake repair~ to the roof, but defendants had agreed to 
do so. 
~\t one or two places in their brief defendants by 
innuendo infer that we were probably required under 
paragraph 3 to take care of the roof if it was in such 
a condition as to require nwre than mere patching up. 
The plain language of paragraph 3 is that we were to 
make permanent improvements which were in the main 
to consist of a new front. The cost of the improvements 
was not to be less than $10,000.00 but could be more. "rhe 
fact that the figure $10,000.00 was used shows that it 
was approxnnately that amount that the parties had in 
mind that the lessees should add to the permanent value 
of defendants' building. It woUld be beyond reason to 
assert that the parties 'had in mind that the $10,000.00 to 
be spent by plaintiffs in adding to the value of the de-
fendants property meant al~o a new roof for the place, 
and pa'rticularly if the new roof was required because 
the premises were actually unfit to be used at all. 
Defendants argue that convenants to keep in repair 
and to keep in as good repair as they .now are amount to 
the same thing. What of it~ That proposition is not in-
volved here. They then repeat and repeat the same thing 
over and over again, and over and over again assert that 
that is all they were required to do because we accepted 
the premises in the condition they were then in. The 
meaning of the words ''to keep in repair,'' and the mean-
ing of the words ''to keep in as good repair as they now 
are'' are not the test here, although as just seen from 
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36 C .• J., supra, ''to keep in repair," Ineans to put in 
1·epair if out of repair. Neither phrase, however, defines 
the defendants' obligations under this lease. 
A brief review of the cases relied upon by defendants 
will he sufficient to indicate that they do not justify any 
holding in favor of the defendants under the facts present 
in the casP at bar. vVe shall spend little time on those 
cases that invol~e only the obligation to keep in repair 
or in as good repair as at the time when the premises 
were leased since the~· have no application here. There-
for, commencing with page 10 of defendants' brief we 
find the case of Farr' vs. Wasatch Chemical Company, 
105 Utah 272, 143 Pac. (2) 281. This case we have already 
discussed at pages 43 and 54 of our first brief, and we 
shall later refer to it herein in connection with the con-
tention of defendants that evidence under some of the 
allegations of our complaint would violate the parol evi-
dence rule with reference to written contracts. The next 
case cited by defendants is on page 11 and is Nixon V:). 
Gammon (Ky.) 229 S.W. 75. Defendants contend that 
the lease in that case provided that the lessee should keep 
the premises in good condition arnd repair. As a matter 
of fact, in reciting the terms of the lease the court at 
first said that the lease provided that the tenant agreed 
to keep the premises in good condition of repair. How-
ever, at another p1ace in the opinion the court uses the 
word ''and'' instead of ''or'' so we are unable to deter-
rnine which i~ the word actually expressed in the lease. 
Nevertheless, in that case the landlord had agreed to 
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make extraordinary repairs, and the tenant to keep the 
pren1ises in such condition as to return them to the lessor 
"'in as good condition a~ they now are." The court said 
that the landlord's agree1nent for extraordinary repairs 
did not mean rebuilding after a fire. lt also held that 
the tenant was only required to keep the building in or- · 
dinary condition which did not include building a roof 
or replacing property destroyed by fire. The case didn't 
say who had to replace the roof which was destroyed by 
fire. However, in the case at bar the lease itself ·demon-
strates that the provisions of paragraph 3 and 6 defining 
the plaintiffs' obligations broad as they were did not con-
template the replacement of property except as specifi-
cally enumerated. Parag1~aph 18 provides that if the 
premises are destroyed entirely at any time the lease shall 
terminate, but •' In the event that said premises are 
rendered untenable by fire or the elements, Lessors agree 
to repair and restore said premises with r·easonable dis-
patch. In case of such repairs the rent due hereunder 
shall abate during the making of the same." Clearly the 
parties to this lease did not contemplate that the lessees 
had any such obligations as defendants now try to infer. 
Paragraph 18 provides that if the premises are rendered 
untenable by the elements the lessors shall repair and 
restore them. The lessors also define their obligation to 
''restore'' the premises as ''repairs.'' Defendants thenl-
8elves have indicated by the lease that the word "re-
pairs'' is far broader than their counsel now insist i:; 
the meaning of the word. If the Nixon case is of any 
value to the court, it is only for the reason that it in-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dicates that the word ''repairs'' does cover ''ordinary 
wear and tear of the building and its decay." The com-
plaint herein expressly alleges that the roof sagged and 
became worse as time went on, and if defendants agreed 
only to repair the roof, (which they did not) they were 
·bound even under that case or under any of the others 
cited hy defendants to take care of what resulted from 
ordinary wear and tear and decay. The complaint ex-
pressly alleges that the roof commenced to sag after the 
lease was entered into and the sagging became worse; 
that it was unsafe at the time the lease was entered into 
an(l became progressively worse. {p. 25 our brief) So 
even under the contention that defendants were only re-
quired to make repairs the complaint iR invnnerable. 
However, it is not necessary to place this case upon any 
narrow ground because the defendants did not agree only 
to keep the roof in ordinary repair or in the same repair 
al-' when the lease was entered into. 
On page 12 of their brief defendants 1nake several 
m~sertions that are' inexcusable. It may be that they were 
carelessly made, but inasmuch as they purport to recite 
the terms of the lease it is difficult to overlook the fact 
that the statements are not true. Defendants say that we 
''agreed to make all 'improvements' and all extr.aordim-
nry repairs of whatsoever kind or character and regard-
leHl-' of the nature and extent thereof ·and hoU'f1H->r neaes-
·"·it.aterl) ". There is no qualification whatsoever in the 
brief to that statement and it is absolutely untrue. The 
dpfendant~ continue: · ''while LesRors, under the con-
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struction placed upon the language of the lease by the 
Kentucky court, agreed to u1ake only ordinary repairH 
to the roof, which the lessees had accepted.'' The first 
stateinent elin1inates all punctuation found in paragraph 
6 of the lease and leaves out the words contained therein 
after • • however necessitated" which words are "except 
as hereinafter stated." vVhile in the second statement 
defendants assert that under the lease they were re-
quired · • to n1ake only ordinary repairs to the roof.'' The 
lease sa~·s no such thing. Then defendants argue: ''Can 
it with reason be contended that the obligation to keep 
an accepted roof in good condition and repair obligated 
the lessor to destroy the roof and the understructure sup-
port thereof and substitute one of steel beam construc-
tion? Would not such a substitution be an 'improvement' 
, or an 'extraordinary .repair' within the obligation of the 
lessees?'' Those statements alone demonstrate the conl-
plete-ly false position created by the defendants. Regard-
ing the last statement, we neither destroyed the roof and 
the understructure support, nor did we accept the roof 
and agree that a~l defendants had to· do was keep it in 
the same condition it was in. If what we did was an "inl-
provement" or" an extraordinary repair" as defendants 
imply, then the defendants definitely were' obligated by 
paragraph 6 alone to do the work, because paragraph 6 
eliminated, by the exception contained therein, our ob-
ligation to make any improvements or extraordinary re-
pairs of the excepted property. Under their own con~ 
struction, as to the excepted property, they had the same 
obligations as we did for that not excepted. Defendants 
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(•,ontinue: ''There is no allegation in the complaint that 
the ~roof as accepted ever beca1ne out of repair." \Ve have 
already called the court's attention to the allegations of 
the cmnplaint which, of course, this court can read for 
itself, and particularly those found on page 25 of our 
fin~t brief. If as defendants imply on page 13 the roof 
was unsafe from the beginning, certainly it would be 
more unsafe fifteen months later when we were to go 
into possession. 
On page 13 defenda-nts cite Kingsted us. Wright, 133 
N. vV. 399. Lessors' covenants in that case were not the 
sarne as in the case at bar. The case holds that the lessors' 
covenants to keep in repair did not impose the duty to 
nmke improvernents or betterments. Under paragraph 6 
of our lease we believe that the exception required the 
lessors to do the same thing with reference to the ex-
cepted property as we were required to do with that not 
Pxcepted and that under paragraph 8 the lesson;;' duty 
was Pven greater. When all paragraphs of the lease are 
construed together including paragraph 18, it is · ob-
viou~ that so far as the roof is concerned even if en-
tirely rebuilding it was involved that obligation was the 
obligation of the lessors. 
At the bottom of page 13 defendants state: "There 
l~ a studious avoidance by appellanti-' of the phrast• 
·keep in good condition a.nd repair' as used in the lease.'' 
In ·view of what we said in our first brief and what we 
have so far said in this brief, that statement is ludicrous. 
We are the ones who have emphasized and ernphasized 
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again the words ··keep in good condition and repair.'' 1t 
is the defendants who have avoided them by leaving 
out the words • • good condition and.'' Then at the top 
of page 14 defendants assert that 32 Am. Jur. pages 
673-4 points out that these terms express entirely dif-
ferent obligations. That is just what we have been ar-
guing. To keep in good condition is entirely different 
than to keep in repair. However, in reading the citations 
from C. J. and An1. Jur. as we have already pointed out, 
it is necessary to read the complete citations on the sub-
ject being considered. Excerpts, with ommissions front 
the text, sometimes convey an entirely different mean-
ing than that actually stated in the text. 
The next case cited by defendants, Cadman vs. By-
Grade Food Products Corpo.ration, (Mass.), 33 N. E. 
(2) 759, we do not find in either volume of 33 N. E. either 
the first or second edition. However, we could agree in 
considering the parol evidence rule in our case with the 
statement attributed to that case by defendants on page 
15: "The phrases 'Vn. g'ood tenable nepair' and in 'good 
condition' appearing in such lease do not have a fixed or 
technical meaning which is always the same regardless of 
the charaeter or use of the building to which they refer.·' 
However, we have not read the case and do not know what 
it holds. We do know, however, that we did not accept an 
unsafe and dangerous roof. If there was any representa-
tion with reference to the roof, it was defendants' repre-
sentation that at the time of the lease it was in good con-
dition. Certainly, they agr,eed that when we .took posses-
sion in June of 1946 it would be in good condition because 
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they agreed that for the entire term of the lease they 
would keep it in that condition. It was not in good condi-
tion when we were to take over under the lease and de-
fendants had not kept it in good condition for the fifteen 
month~ prior to our occupancy. 
ngFJ1~NDANTH' CONrrENTJON THAT '' Lli~S80H~ 
OBLIGATED TO _MAKE ONLY ORDINAfiY RF~­
PAIR~ TO THE HOOF" (Page 16) 
\Vhat we have already said in our original brief and 
In this brief, we think answers defendants' arguments 
<·ommencing at page Hi and ending at page 23. It might 
he added, however, that the complaint sets forth the con-
struction that defendants placed on the lease they drew, 
(which construction we believe was correct) and that 
they did make special covenants and stipulations with 
regard to the roof. The lessors did not as defendants' 
<"onnsel now contend make' only a general covenant, and 
the lessees a larger covenant. The lessees' covenant con-
tains an exception which exception is as broad as the 
covenant from which it is excluded and is amplified by 
paragraph 8. Defendants argue that we did more than 
,the~! were required to do because we removed an entire 
roof and supporting structure constructed of wood and 
substituted therefor one of steel beam construction. The 
complaint and the bill of particulars show that we used 
all the old materials from the original roof it was p,ossible 
to use; that steel beam construction was cheaper at that 
tirne than lumber and also that the only kind of lumber 
ohtainahle was green and unsuitable for use in roofs; 
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that 60% or Inore of the old Inaterial in the roof was used 
in the work of fixing the roof and that we eliminated frmn 
our costs anything that 1nade the roof more expensive 
than actually replacing what formerly existed. (Bill of 
Particulars, •brief 33-34) However, what we did was 
only what was necessary and required by the public 
authorities. If to have a roof in good condition required 
us to do what we did, then the roof could not be kept in 
good condition without the doing of what we did. 
It would unduly extend this brief, now already too 
long, to discuss in detail every case cited by defendants, 
but there is one case cited by them, Lurcolt1t vs. Wakely, 
(1911), 1 K. B. 905, that does need special attention-not 
because of what defendants have said concerning it, but 
because of what they have failed to say. Actually the 
principles announced in that case when applied to the 
case at bar are decidedly against the defendants. We 
wonder if they actually read the case. In that case the 
tenant agreed to well and substantially repair and keep 
in thorough repair and good condition aH of the premises 
demised. The lease ran for a great many years. One of 
the walls 'because of age became unsafe. To repair it re-
quired that it be rebuilt. The court said that under the 
aforesaid covenants of the tenant it was the tenant's 
duty to rebuild the wall. If the entire house had become 
unsafe, the duty to make it safe was that of the landlord. 
There are three o-pinions in the case. One by Cozens-
Hardy, M. R.; ·one by Fletcher Moulton, L. J.; and one· 
by Buckley, L. J. Defendants' quotatio~ is from the 
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op1mon by Lord. Buckley. But even defendants' quota-
tion is against them as appears merely from reading it. 
'"fhe quotation given by defendants is not complete. The 
complete quotation on the subject under discus~ion in-
clurling that omitted is as follows: 
''A roof falls out of repair~ the necessary 
work is to replace decayed timbers hy sound wood; 
to substitute sound titles or slatef-! for thoRe which 
are cracked, broken or missing; to make good the 
flashings, (defendants called these flushings), and 
the like.'' (The following is omitted by defend-
ants :) ''Part of a garden wall tumbles down; re-
pair is affected by building it up again with new 
mortar, and so far as necessar:v, new bricks or 
stone. Repair is restoration by renewal or re-
placement of subsidiary parts of a whole. Re-
newal as distinguished from repair, is reeonstruc-
tion of the entirety, meaning by the entirety not 
necessarily the whole hut substantially the whole 
subjeet matter under discussion.'' (The defend-
ants' quotation then eontinues:) ''I agree that if 
repair of the whole subject matter has become im-
possible a covenant to repair does not carry an 
obligation to renew or replace.'' 
However, this judge as well as the other two hold that 
under the tenant's covenants he had to rebuild the wall, 
hut if the whole house had needed rebuilding that would 
have been the obligation of the landlord. Applying these 
principles to the case at bar, had the roof fallen down 
''repair is affected by building it up again.'' Certainly, 
it cannot be contended that we were required to wait 
until the roof fell in on us, nor tha.t had the roof fallen in 
i 
l 
I 
I 
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on u~ defendants then and not until then, would han· been 
required to build it up again; that tlwy coi1ld wait un-
til it actually fell in before that dut~· devolved upon them. 
rrhere i~ no principle with whieh "'e are familiar that 
would justify any ~uch nonsen~e. 1'ht> judge~ dit-H·ussed 
another and earlier case to this efft::>et: \Yhere the tenant 
had agreed to keep the prenlis<-'~ in good tenantable re-
pair · • if tlw floor bec01ne rotten, the tenant must put 
in a new floor unles~ he e.an rnake the floor good h~· or-
dinary repair. The floor was a subsidian· part of the 
whole. The house could not be occupied if the floor were 
rotten, and the tenant to comply with l1is covenant as to 
tenantable repair, n1ust either ·1nake it good hy repair or 
replace it. for otherwise the house would not be tenant-
able ... In our case if the roof bee-arne unsafe the land-
lord must put in a ne,,· roof unless he can make the roof 
safe by ordinary repair. The premises could not be oc-
cupied if the roof were unsafe, and the landlord to comply 
with his covenant to keep in good condition must either 
make the roof good by repair or replace it, otherwise 
the roof would not be in good condition. We make this 
analogy because of the construction another judge in 
that case placed upon the words ''thorough repair.'' In 
that case since the wall could not be repaired without re-
building it the court held it must be rebuilt. In the de-
ci~ions is found this language : ''It is only repair in the 
~en:.;e that it is restored to stability and safety a sub-
orrlinate part of the whole.'' Applying the. principles of 
that case to our case: even had there been here no cove. 
nan.t on the part of the landlord and had the roof become 
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so unsafe as to require replacing of the whole, the re-: 
building would have been the obligation of the landlord 
because we made no covenant to replace or rebuild any-
thing. The English court holds that if renovating or re-
newing or repairing requires the rebuilding of the whole 
that obligat1on falls upon the landlord and not the tenant. 
In the ·case at bar, however, the landlord specifically 
agreed to keep the whole roof in good condition. Lord 
Fletcher Moulton's opinion is very helpful in our case. He 
used this language: ''The words are a description of 
a state and not a mode by which 'that state is arrived 
at, and therefore, in my own mind I draw no wide 
distinction between keeping in thorough repair and 
keeping in good condition; they both appear to nie 
to describe the condition of the house.'' He also said: 
''I think that to keep in thorough repair does not in any 
way . confine the duty of the person who is liable under 
the covenant to the doing of what are ordinarily called 
repairs.'' This judge defined the words ''keep in good 
condition" to be the same as "keep in thorough repair.'' 
He said they were not the same as ''what are ordinarily 
called repairs. ' ' H·e also said : '.'If a house is in such 
a condition so that it is dangerous to the public, and that 
a portion of it has to be pulled down and rebuilt at the 
demand of the authorities on the ground of public safety 
-which must be the safety of the people within as well 
as without-,-there is a plain breach of the covenant to 
keep in good condition.'' This judge not only says ''good 
condition'' is different from ''ordinary repairs'' but 
also says that if a thing is dangerous and unsafe and 
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must bt> repla(•ed at thP demand of tlw puhlie autlwritiP~, 
it i~ not in good condition. 
Ht>fPrring now to three uwre of def(mdant:::; ea~t>:-;, 
P~<l Anw~ement C'o. rs. RuthenlJilrg, 1:~1 ~.\Y. :~f>l; 
W<~Jh:r 1·~. Cos_o.rore. (Ky. l~l2;->), :273 H.vV. -1:>0, and 
JJwight rs. Ludlou· Jlfg. Co., (.:\la~:::;.) 128 .l\Iass. 280, 282: 
In Tralke1· rs. Cosgrore the tenant agreed to take good 
earp of the pro-perty and pay for ordinary repairs. A 
<lrain wa~ in poor condition when he took possession. 
Tlw ease only holds thaf hi:::; obligation \\·as to umke re-
pairs that resulted from his use. Of course, that case has 
no application here. Actually that ease involved an at-
tPmpt by the landlord to raise the tenant's rent, and the 
court recognized that the repair feature injected by the 
landlord was si1nply a subterfuge to compel the tenant 
either to pa~· increased rent or to get out. The D'wight vs. 
L'udlmc case is really an authority for us. AH we are ask-
ing in the case at bar is what the court required to be 
done in that case. All we are asking is that· defendant re-
store the roof so that it would be capable of doing wh~t 
it did after its original construction. So far as appears 
in the case at bar the original roof as originally con-
:-;tructed was adequate. It apparently passed the build-
ing inspector then, but when we went to take possession 
it was in such a condition as to be unsafe and inadequate. 
'Vl1en it reached that condition, no one knows, nor do 
Wp know whether building requirements had changed; 
whether the roof was inadequate because of the strain put 
npon it hy time, or for what reason. All we know is what 
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the building inspector told us and what was actually di~­
closed when we went to work on the roof. The building 
inspector said it was unsafe and we could not occupy the 
premises in that condition. Actually the roof proved to 
be unsafe as disclosed when we went to work on it. Re-
gardless of what else it holds, 'the case of Plaza Amuse-
ment Company vs. Rothlevnberg, holds that the lessee wa~ 
not required to 1nake structural changes regardless of 
the provisions of his lease with reference to keeping the 
preinises in as good order and eondition as when leased; 
That case also holds that the parties must be assumed 
not to have intended to violate the law. In our lease it 
is expressly provided by paragraph 7 that we will oc-
cupy the premises in a lawful manner. We could not oc-
cupy them in a lawful manner and disregard the building 
inspector. 
Defendants say (brief p. 21): "Counsel realize that 
they are on narrow footing if they must rely on the lease 
itself, so they assert that it is alleged in the complaint 
* * *," etc. They then quote rules of law from which 
there is no dissent that parol evidence cannot vary the 
terms of a written contract. We rely on the terms of the 
lease. But, also, the complaint alleges that defendant 
James L. White drew the lease and that upon discussing 
it with the plaintiff Hubert Wolfe he represented to Mr. 
Wolfe that under the lease plaintiffs had no responsibili-
ty for the roof and that the provisions of the lease with 
respect to accepting the premises did not apply to the 
roof; that t:re roof was the sole responsibility of the de-
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fendants: tl1at plaintiffs would hav(-' no n'sptm~ibility 
what.Pver for the roof. \Ye b(-'liPY(-' that l\1 r. White eorrect-
ly advi~t>d .\I r. \Yolft~ and that tlw leasl~ does l'Xcwtly 
what he said it did. ln spite of the eontention~ to tlw t'Oll-
trary by .\lr. \Vhite ·~ eounsel WP believp that he told 
.\I r. \f olfe the truth. However, the lo\ver l'onrt took the 
interpretation of the defendants' eounsel and construed 
the lease to nwan ~Oinething different than in our judg-
ment it aetually does 1nean. \Y <' did not believe ·and we 
do not now believe that any a1nendn1ent to the complaint 
wa:- n(-'eessary. \Ye believe that the lease sa,vs exactly 
what .\I r. \Vhite represented it to sa~·. However, because 
the lower court took the other view, it becmne material 
to allege the interpretation placed upon the lease by the 
person who drew it. This i~ not evidence to vary the 
terms of a written contract by parol. vVe think that the 
case of Farr ·vs. Wasatch Chemical Company) 105 Utah, 
272, 143 Pae. (2) 281, supra, is authority for some of the 
amendn1ents to the complaint. The principle therein an-
nounced is the same as expressed and enlarged by Wil-
liston in his latest work on "The Law of Contracts," the 
Revised :H~dition in 1938, at Sec. 629 under the heading 
'' Hurrounding circumstances may always be shown.'' 
Under defendants' argument the lease to say the least 
is arnbiguous. Under all authorities any ambiguity will 
hP resolved against the lessor and particularly where he 
is thP one who drew the lease. The lea-se will be con-
strued against him. However, the amendments to the 
complaint mere]~· atternpt to show the interpretation put 
upon the ]pasP by the parties before it was ever signed. 
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It is alleged that the plaintiffs never inspected the roof 
and knew nothing about its condition and that Mr. 'Vhite 
assured them that they were not accepting the roof and 
that the lease was clear on that point. Williston's quotes 
.from a federal case as follows : 
1 ' ' '"Che correct principle has been well sum-
marized in a federal decision. (Eustis .Mining Co. 
vs. Beer, 239 F. 976, 985) · All the attendant facts 
constituting the setting of a contract are admis-
sible, so long as they are helpful; the extent of 
their assistance depends upon the different ntean-
ings which the language itself will let in. Hence 
we may say, truly perhaps, that, if the language 
is not ambiguous, no evidence is admisible, mean-
ing no more than that it could not control the 
Hense, if we did let it in; indeed, it might 'con-
tradict' the contract-that is, the actual words 
should be remembered to have a higher probative 
value, when ·explicit, than can safely be drawn by 
inference from surroundings. Yet, as all language 
will bear some different meanings, some evidence 
is always admissible; the line of exclusion de-
pends on how far the words will stretch, and how 
alien is the intent they are asked to include. What-
ever may he the propriety of admitting ·evidence of 
extrinsic facts where the meaning of the instru-
ment is apparently clear, there is no question that 
such evidence is admissible in every jurisdiction 
where there is no clear apparent meaning. It must 
'be kept in mind, however, that the only purpose 
for which such evidence is ev,er admissible in an 
action on the contract is to interpret· the writing. 
So far as the evidence tends to show not the mean-
ing of the writing but an intention wholly unex-
pressed in the writing, it is irrelevant." 
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'l'hi~ thought i~ expressed by the Restateinent of the 
Law of Contrad:-;, A1nerican Law Institute print, under 
Re<>. 236 (b) : 
'· 'L'h~ principal apparent purpose of the 
partie:-; i~ giYen great weight in determining the 
1neaning to be given to manifestations of inten-
tion or to an~- part thereof.·' 
See. (d): 
· • Where words or other 1nanifestations of in-
tention bear nwre than one reasonable 1neaning 
an interpretation i~ preferred which operates 
nwre :-;trongly against the part~· from whom the~· 
proceed, unless their use b~- him i~ prescribed by 
law." 1 
The following language is also found in the aforesaid 
Re::;;tatement under Comments to (f) of Sec. 235: 
·'Yet, as all language will bear .some different 
1neanings, evidence of surroundings is always ad-
Inissible.'' · 
If the contract Ineans what defendants contend it 
means, then Mr. White misrepresented its meaning to 
the plaintiff~, and they signed as a result of such mis-
representation. That is pleaded in the complaint as is 
also that :Mr. White is estopped now to assert that the 
contract mean~ what his counsel say it does. Under the 
rulP in thP F'ai-r vs. Wasatch Chemical case the parties 
ma~- he said, because of defendants' present contention, 
to have a <·ollateral agrement with reference to the roof, 
i.P., that the roof wa~ no obligation of plaintifft-; and 
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that the writing expressly obligated defendantg to do 
everything with reference to the roof. However, as al-
ready stated, we believe that the lease means exactly 
\vhat we alleged Mr. White told the plaintiff Mr. Wolfe 
it did mean; that is that the lessors assumed all obliga-
tions with reference to the roof and that in accepting 
the premises in their present condition the roof was ex-
cluded by express language in the lease. 
Defendants assert on page 23 that any staten1ent::; 
that ~[r. White made after the lease were immaterial. 
Any statements Mr. White made after the signing of 
the lease· with reference to the roof would be a further 
interpretation by him as to the meaning of the lease with 
reference to the roof. 
DEFENDAN·TS' ARGU:MENT THA'T "ACTS OF 
BUILDING INSPECTOR Il\1POSED NO OBLIGA-
TION ON LESSORS" (Page 23) 
We have already discussed this phase of the case 
in our first brief, and we . confess that we are unable to 
follow defendants' argument at all. They repeat the er-
roneous assertions previously made that we were bound 
to make all the repairs however necessitated and insinu-
ate that the roof was our obligation if it was unsafe, 
etc. The fact is that the building inspector woul~ not let 
us occupy the property under the lease until the roof was 
made safe. It is immaterial when it became unsafe. We 
allege that as time progressed it became more unsafe 
and that its condition ·became worse after the lease was 
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~ntered into. The building in~peetor ·~ letter~ clearly 
indicate that the roof wa~ in had eondition, that it wa~ 
not in good condition. \Vhen or how the overstressing 
and tl1e bowing of the rafters, trusses and girders oc-
curred does not appear, but these eonditions did becmne 
worse until they rendered the prernises untenantable at 
the tirne we were to go into possession. At the top of page 
26 defendants ~a~·: .. So in seeking the permit, the Lesspe:-; 
intended to ntake perntanent iu1pro_vn1ents which if they 
desired, could include eonstruction of a new roof of steel 
beam construetion but which would have nothing at all 
to do with the repair of the then existing roof.'' The 
actual wording of the lease indicates how flimsy is this 
argument. 
Defendant~ cite three cases on page 26: Pra,tt vs. 
Grafton Electric Company, (~lass.) 65 N. E. 63, Knight 
V.'i. Foster) (N.C.) 79 S.E. 614, and Victor A. Harter 
Realty Compan.lJ 1.:s. Lee, 132 K. Y. S. 447, to show that 
they were under no obligation to comply with the orders 
of the public authorities. In the Grafton case the lease 
expressly provided that the lessors should not be re-
quired to make an~· repairs on the leased premises nor 
to furnish any substitute in case of destruction, loss or 
rlamage. The 1esseP was required at its own expense to 
make all necessary repairs to the flumes, gates, bulk-
heads, and leased property, to keep them in proper con-
(lition for u:-;e. The court said that under such stipula-
tions there was no implied covenant on the part of the 
landlord to rnake repairs ordered by the public authori-
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ties because the gates in the Inillpond were rotten and 
in need of repair. 'rhe· lessees· expressly agreed to keep 
the gates in proper condition for use, and the lessors ex-
pressly agreed they would not furnish any substitute 
for the gates in case of their destruction, loss or damage. 
All that the court did was follow the terms of the. lease 
which is all that we ask the court to do in the present 
case. In the Knight case the court e:x:pressly said that 
if the landlord knew that the premises were in violation 
of law by disrepair, both he and the tenant would be 
liable to a third person for any injury due to the de-
fective premises, and particularly if the landlord con-
tracts to repair the very thing which is in disrepair. The 
court also said, as we say with respect to the roof in this 
case, that fixing the gate was a change and not a repair, 
and so the duty was upon the landlord to make it, but 
liability was also upon the tenant for injuries to third 
persons; that if the nuisance existed at the time of the 
demise both the tenant and the landlord are liable. In 
the case at bar we wished to escape this liability by 
having the nuisance that existed corrected before we 
went into possession. In the Harter case the lease pro-
vided that the tena.nt should comply with all the rules, 
ordinances and regulations of the City Government, and 
with this express provision the court said that the tenant 
was required to make repairs to the building required 
by orders of the municipal authorities, sho1rt of a re-
oonstruction of the house. So that case is authority for 
the proposition that even though the lease requires the 
tenant to comply with orders of the public authorities 
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h~ i~ not required to do ~o when such order~ requin.• a 
recon.strudion, and that is the rule of law generally 
recognized. Those c.a~e~ when applied to the ensp at bar 
when• the lessors agreed to ke~p the roof in good con-
dition, show that defendanb are the one~ who are re-
quired to con1ply with the order~ of the publi<' authorities 
particularly when the reconstruetion diredly concerns 
that portion of the preruis~s over "·hirh the)' assumed 
tlw obligation. 
The ea~e of Clark rs. r ukvn Inrt'stmen,t CoJJtpan.iJ, 
14-;) Pa<_·. 624, also cited by defendants on page 26 is not 
applicable to the fact8 in our case. The Supren1e Court 
of 'Vashington points out that there was a statute re-
quiring the owner to do certain things and that that 
meant the owner of the business; that the statute ap-
plied to the lessee because it was the nature of t}le lessee's 
hm;inesl:' that necessitated the improven1ents ~pe<'ified 
by the statute. The lessor had stipulated that it should 
not be required to expend any money on the premises 
and the lessee had expressly agreed that it would not per-
mit any violation of the laws of the State of Washing-
ton. None of those elements are present in the case at 
har. On page 27 counsel place their own construction on 
thl' ease cited by us, at page 48 of our first brief, Her-
a.ld Squar, Realty Company vs. SaksJ (N.Y.) 109 N.E. 
;)4:>. The principle that the landlord must rnake struc-
tural <'hanges required by public authority is there an-
nounced. This court can interpret the case ·withqut us re-
fPn1ng to it further. Of course, that is true of all the 
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cases cited by either of us, but when counsel assert that 
cases stand for things they do not stand for we cannot 
let such a~sertions go by without comment. 
On page 28 of their brief defendants say that they 
had no obligation to heed the building inspector's letters. 
In other words, that they could ignore the law. This 
court answered the question very -effectively in the case 
of Wilcox vs. Jan'ieson, 55 Utah 535, 188 Pac. 638, cited 
hy U8 at page 51 of our first brief. Counsel for defend-
ants argue that the building inspector didn't serve any 
notice in writing by personal service on the lessors. That 
does not affect the lessors' liability under our lease. If 
Salt Lake City was attempting to inflict a punishment 
for violation of the ordinance, lessors might plead lack 
of service of the notice. That, however, does not affect 
their civil·liability or their liability under the lease. The 
building inspector's letters show and the complaint al-
leges that the defendants were advised repeatedly about 
the unsafe condition of the roof. The building inspector 
pointed out specifically what was wrong and asked for 
a submission of plans to correct the condition. He did 
not attempt to dictate what the details of roof construc-
tion should he. That was left to the parties. The defend-
ants could have submitted any plan they desir,ed and any 
plan that was adequate would have been approved by the 
building inspector. They refused to do anything. The 
building inspector set forth what must be done, and de-
fendants refused to do anything. 
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Dr~~.,J1~N DAXT~. ~\RU lT~II~~NT THAT "LJ:iJH~l~EH 
8J1JEK TO RECOVER FOR. STRlTCTURAL IM-
PROV~~l\l~JNT~" (Page 31 and Breach of Covenant 
of Quiet Enjoy1nent page i~-!) 
Under this heading defendants argu~:· that the penua-
nent ilnprovements we were to umke at a eo:-;t of not 
les~ than $10.000.00 rnig·ht have included the roof. The 
fact that the parties used the figure $10,000.00 and 
specifically stated that the permanent improvernents 
shoulrl include the installation of a first-class front shows 
that they did not have in mind an~-thing with reference 
to the roof nor \Yith reference to improvement~ that 
would run to two or three times $10,000.00. The whole 
tenor of the lease including paragraph 6 indicates that 
we were not to make structural improvements generally. 
Paragraph 18 as well as paragraph 8 as well as general 
law hold that defendants· have the liability they seek 
by insinuation to impose on us. Counsel repeatedly harp 
upon the fact that we used steel, in spite of the allega-
tions of the complaint that we used the cheapest con-
~truction possible. 
On page :i-! counsel argue that we clairn a breach of 
thP covenant of quiet enjoyment. We have spent little 
time on this phase of the case, but actually under the 
caHe of Heywood vs. Ogden M~otor Compa;n;y, 71 Utah 
-t 17, 266 Pac. 1040, cited by us at page 49 of our first 
brief, WP were kept out of possession of the premises by 
the adH of the defendants. As we recall it there was no 
PXJH'P~:-; covenant of enjoyn1ent in the Heywood case 
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while in our case there is an express covenant that the 
lessees ''shall and may in accordance herewith peace-
fully. and quietly have, hold and enjoy said demised 
premises during the term hereof,'' paragraph 16 of the 
lease, page 10 of our first brief. Defendants argue that 
there was no violation of this covenant of the lease be-
cause there was no eviction. They cite certain authori-
ties including 32 Am. Jur. page 231, etc. In our case 
there was an actual eviction because we were unable to go 
into beneficial possession when we should have done, 
and there likewise was a constructive eviction because 
thereafter we were deprived of the beneficial enjoyment 
of the deinised preinises-by reason of acts of the defend-
ants. It is not necessary that there be an actual physical 
ouster or dispossession in order to constitute an actual 
eviction. Am. Jur., supra, says: "The ancient rule of the 
common rule that entry or exprulsion, or some real dis-
turbance of the possession, was required to establish 
eviction of a tenant by his landlord has been so far modi-
fied in favor of the tenant that raCt1.()al oust,er or physical ' 
dispossessilon is no longer necessary to constitute an 
eviction." (Italics added). If the tenant. later resumes 
possession, he may waive the eviction but that does not 
waive the damages flowing therefrom. The authorities 
are in conflict as to whether an eviction terminates the 
obligations of the tenant under the lease. We had no de-
sire to terminate our obligations but adopted the alter-
native available to us of fixing the roof ourselves and 
holding the defendants liable thereof. The covenant of 
"quiet enjoyment" is a covenant that the tenant will be 
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free from aetua.l disturbance of his possession, Hnd that 
he will he protectPd fro1n unlawful interferenep hy others 
in enjoying the de1nisP~ premisP~. K oeber rs. Summers, 
8-! "X. \Y. ~)~ll. 99:2. "fhat the eity interfered with our pos-
sP~~ion cannot be disputed. The defendants did not pro-
teet us frmn thi~ interference nor front actual disturb~ 
ance of our possession. It is n1erely begging the question 
t(') sa~- that the cit~· officiab did not notit\ defendants in 
writing- that we could not occupy the premises unless the 
roof \Va:-: made safe. In the FaiT vs. Wasatch Chernical 
east>. ~upra, this eourt says: ''The language 'keep ~aid 
premises tenantable' indicates that the parties under-
stood the warehouse would be Inade tenantable.'' So in 
our lease ''The language 'keep the roof in good condi-
tion' indicates that the parties understood that the roof 
would be made in good condition.·' We think the lease is 
clear that it was defendants· obligation at all times to 
maintain on the premises a roof in good condition. If it 
is not clear frmn the lease, then oral evidence concern-
ing the responsibility therefor, if there _is such evidence 
and the cornplaint pleads that there is, Inay be offered. 
W P were kept from the premises by fault of the defend-
ants in our judgment. We have made no effort in this 
<·asp to recover anything by way of damages for evic-
tion except for the damages proximately resulting front 
ac·tual dispossession of the premises for the purpose for 
whic-h they were leased. 
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DJ£B,_b~NDANTS CLAll\t rrHEY AHE :H~X~~~lP'P 
FRO~I LIABILITY (Page 38) 
Defendants devote several pages ( 38-43) to a dis-
cussion of paragraph 11 of the lease. Reading paragraph 
11 in connection with all of the lease it is perfectly ob-
vious that all that paragraph does is to exonerate lessors 
frofll our failure to perform our obligations to ~eep the I 
premises in repair. Paragraph 11 is mainly devoted to 
an enumeration. of damage to be caused by plumbing, 
ga~, water, stea1n pipes, and from damag.e occasioned 
by acts of neighboring tenants. The paragraph clearly 
is not an attempt to exempt lessors from their liability 
but is an exemption of lessors fro_m liability for the 
acts or omissions of others. Be that as it may, the para-
graph does not exempt the lessors from liability for 
damage occasioned by failure ''to keep the roof in good 
condition." There is no mention of that"in the paragraph. 
Under the authorities cited by us in our original 
brief even a clause such as we have here if applied to 
acts or omissions of the lessor would not exempt the 
landlord from liability for that portion of the pre111ises 
over which he retained responsibility. But paragraph 11 
of the lease does not exempt defendants from liability 
for failure ''to keep the roof in good condition,'' under 
the lease, or any authorities or rule. 
We have already sufficiently discussed the remain-
ing contentions of defendants' brief headed by them 
"Comments on linmaterial Allegations" ( 43). As stated 
above we believe the lease says exactly what Mr. White 
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told ~lr. \~~ olfl. it did say. If, however, there is any doubt 
(•on(•.erning this, that doubt will he resolved against lll r. 
\\~hite both for the reason that he i~ the le~sor and also 
for tht:> n~ason that he is the person who d rt:>w tlw lease. 
If thert:> i~ any ambignit~· or if U1ere art:> any oral rep-
resentations a~ to the n1eaning of tht:> lease rnade to in-
duce its signing·, which are different than now clairned, 
or any oral agreernenb not contained in the lease, not 
only may evidence be introduced to establish the facts, 
but )1 r. \Vhitt:> is estopped to contend for a different 
com;truction of the lease than that which he represented 
to )Jr. Wolfe would be the construction placed upon it. 
We cannot pass without eonunent, however, defend-
ant~' attempt again in the dosing pages of their brief 
to fasten upon us by insinuation the responsibility for 
tlw roof. 'fhey again rnisquote paragraph 6 ( 45) ''regard-
le~~ of how the same rnay be necessitated'' and assert that 
the letters of the building inspector were to require to 
be done sornething "necessitated'' within our special 
obligations. A~ pointed out above, the lease actually con-
tains a cormna after the word ''necessitated'' and says, 
''except a~ hereinafter stated.'' Anything necessary to 
hfl donp to the roof comes within the express exception 
<·ontained therein. 
Defendants concede on page 46 that we had the 
right to fix the roof in this language : ''Well, as soon as 
their 'right ,of possession accrued,' they did actually 'go 
in· while the roof 'was still in this condition' and con-
~tnwt a nfJu· roof of steel beam construction and a new 
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understructure. If they did not possess the right to ·do 
thi~ work under the lease, frmn what s()urce did they de-
rive their authority'?" Of course, the defendants use the 
foregoing language for an entirely different purpose 
than that of showing that we had the right to do what 
we did, but it nevertheless is a concession by defendants 
of· this right, and we leave them to answer their own 
question which they have not done in their brief. W P 
also agree with defendants' state1nent on page 47: "If 
Lessors were liable at all to construct a new roof, it is 
imm~terial when the roof began to sag.'' 
·It is unnecessary to make further comment on the 
conclusions set forth in ·eight sub-headings in the last 
pages of defendants' brief. Further comment would 
merely constitute further repetition. The whole brief i~ 
baseq upon the argument advanced on nearly every 
page,-in fact in nearly every paragraph-that we ac-
cepted a defective roof and that they were only bound 
to keep the roof in repair. Neither premise is correct, 
as we have pointed out almost with the same amount of 
repetition made necessary by the repeated assertions of 
defendants. 
The complaint herein stated a cause of action both 
before and after each of the amendments. The judgment 
of the lower court should be reversed, (·1) For sustain-
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ing the dennu1·er to the original cmnplaint ~ (2) ~'or sus-
taining the d~nlUITer to paeh of the amend1nents. 
Hespeetfully suhn1itted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONJiJ~ anrl 
RICH & STRONG 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
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